Introduction
Various studies have shown the remarkable impact of schooling quality on economic growth 1 and during the last decade governments the world over have made school education policies a focus of their attention. The Economist (2011) refers to the latter as "The great schools revolution" and emphasizes the crucial role that the PISA studies have played in this context by providing both internationally comparable data and eyeͲopening analyses. Since the first PISA implementation in 2000 researchers have used these rich datasets to identify key elements of successful education policies. One of the most important policy implications is summarized by Hanushek (2006, p. 866) who states that " […] evidence […] suggests that pure resource policies that do not change incentives are unlikely to be effective." There are two implications from this conclusion.
First, incentives may serve as a useful tool to improve an educational system's outcome. On principle, every agent who is involved in educational production can be incentivized. Recent research, however, has focused on incentives for students, teachers, and schools. 2 While the literature on student incentives yields rather inconclusive results, 3 direct incentives for schools and in particular for teachers tend to affect students' outcomes positively. This holds true for studies in the United States (Figlio & Kenny, 2007) , in Israel (Lavy, 2002 , 2009 ), in India (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011 as well as between countries (Wößmann, 2011). However, some papers show that teachers respond "too well" to incentives and consequently disregard nonͲincentivized goals. Reback (2008) , Jacob (2005) , Eberts, Hollenbeck & Stone (2002) , and Glewwe, Ilias & Kremer (2010) find that teachers focus only on the incentivized target group and the success of incentivized measures. Goals that are not part of the incentive scheme but may still be desirable from society's point of view may not benefit or may even suffer from the incentive schemes.
Second, the institutional framework of a schooling system may matter more than the mere availability of resources. Among the institutions that have attracted analysts' attention are accountability systems such as curriculumͲbased external exit exams. Figlio & Loeb (2011) discuss the incentive effect of such systems on schools if the schools' future development -implicitly or explicitly -depends on the performance measures. Furthermore, external exams may provide a guideline for agents in the education system and thus reduce insecurity of students, teachers, and schools. 4 CrossͲcountry evidence suggests that centralized exit exams indeed affect student's outcomes positively (Bishop, 1997; Wößmann, Lüdemann, Schütz & West, 2009 2 Of course, teachers are part of the school and incentives for schools and teachers may consequently not be separable. Please refer to the hypotheses and the analysis of the estimation results for a further discussion on this topic. 3 While girls respond to incentives in some cases (Angrist & Lavy, 2009; Kremer, Miguel & Thornton, 2009) , in others they do not (Fryer Jr., 2011) . For boys the consequences of explicit incentives seem even less promising (Angrist & Lavy; Fryer Jr.) . In particular the study by Fryer Jr. points out how much the reaction of students to incentives may depend on the details of the respective setup. 4 Another aspect is highlighted by De Paola & Scoppa (2010) for the case of centralized exit exams. These can on the one hand serve as an incentive device for the schools. On the other hand, standardized tests provide a less dispersed measure of graduates' abilities for employers. Consequently, students themselves could be incentivized by such an institution as they anticipate that prospective employers put more weight on results from standardized exams than from nonͲstandardized ones.
(2010) as well as Jürges, Schneider, Senkbeil & Carstensen (2012) confirm this positive tendency by analyzing variation between German states. However, they also conclude that centralized exit exams can reduce students' interest, at least in mathematics. Furthermore, a meta study by Holme, Richards, Jimerson & Cohen (2010) casts some doubt on the robustness of the positive evidence mentioned above. While Figlio & Loeb share those doubts in particular when it comes to reading scores, they conclude that "school accountability improves average student performance in affected schools, at least in general" (p. 410).
While this literature suggests that both teacher and school incentives as well as accountability can improve a schooling system, new evidence by Hanushek, Link & Wößmann (2011) points to the need for a more detailed analysis. They combine the data from various PISA studies and, based on withinͲ country variation, find that institutions -such as school autonomy in their paper -may work well in certain countries and cultures while they are counterproductive in others. Furthermore, the authors discuss the positive interaction of autonomy with accountability and thus point out the importance of the interplay of various institutions.
In the present paper data from PISA 2000 and PISA 2009 are combined to analyze the interplay of accountability and teacher/school incentives. The estimations reveal that standardized tests per se do not have a consistently significant impact on PISA scores. It is shown, however, that it is important how the results of these tests are used. While the combination with teacher evaluation yields a significant decrease of PISA scores, it seems useful if schools as a whole are compared and rated based on the results of standardized tests.
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section introduces the econometric approach, discusses the key variables, and states the hypotheses. In section 3 and 4 the estimation results are reported and discussed. Section 5 concludes.
Econometric approach
This paper is based on the datasets of PISA 2000 and PISA 2009 that are combined into one dataset to analyze institutional effects of withinͲcountry variation on PISA scores. 5 There are several reasons for this approach. First, the abovementioned literature on the effect of schooling quality on economic growth has shown the importance of PISA outcomes as schooling quality measures. Second, the rich PISA datasets include various studentͲ and schoolͲlevel variables that can be used as controls when analyzing the effects of standardized tests and teacher/school incentives on student outcomes. Third, the focus of PISA alternates between reading, mathematics, and science literacy. In 2009 reading was the first focus to be repeated, which results in very similar school and student questionnaires that simplify the merging process of the data. Fourth, the almost ten years that lay between the studies provide enough time for -potentially PISAͲtriggered -schooling reforms to affect student performance.
Ͳ 6 Ͳ Aside from the direct interpretation of the variable, the use of standardized tests for the assessment of 15 year olds can as well be interpreted as an indicator for the tendency to use centralized exams in a schooling system in general. Panel A of Figure 1 shows that there is a strong trend to increase the use of standardized tests at the country level, with only 6 of 38 countries reducing the average use of this assessment method. This trend is significant (p=0.000, Wilcoxon signedͲrank test). From the point of view of a standard economic theory, this trend should only result in changes of PISA performance if two conditions are satisfied. First, the content of the standardized tests needs to be related to the skills assessed by PISA. Second, agents in the schooling system need to be motivated through incentives -explicit or implicit -to aim at higher student scores in standardized tests. In this study it is assumed that such incentives are given at least to some extent for schools and teachers if the answers to questions 16 d) and 16 f), respectively, are "yes". While the design -and thus the power -of these incentives remain unclear, it seems reasonable to assume that a school that is compared to other schools based on the results of standardized student assessments feels more bound to set standards than a school for which this is not the case. Similarly, a teacher whose effectiveness judgement depends on his students' performance in standardized tests is assumed to comply more with the set standards than a colleague for whom this is not the case. The variables are thus subsequently referred to as school incentives and teacher incentives, respectively. Panel B and C of Figure As discussed before, research clearly indicates that standardized tests as well as teacher and school incentives tend to positively influence PISA performance. This leads to the first hypothesis:
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Key variables and hypotheses
H1: Standardized tests, teacher incentives, and school incentives all have a positive impact on PISA scores.
The present paper is the first to explicitly analyze the interplay of standardized tests and incentives. As expressed by H1, it is concluded from the literature that incentives affect agents' behaviour. Under the assumption that the content of the standardized tests is related to the content examined by PISA, this effect should be even larger if objective criteria such as standardized tests are used as performance measures. This leads to the second hypothesis:
The combination of school and teacher incentives with standardized tests yields a further increase of PISA performance.
On the other hand, hypothesis H2 may be rejected if the standardized tests are not or poorly related to PISA assessments.
Regression models and identification
Similar to the framework of Hanushek et al., the analysis of this paper is based on the following education production function, subsequently referred to as the general model:
where the achievement T of a student i in country c at a point of time t is the results of various inputs. These inputs stem from the student and her family (F), her school (S), the respective country's policies (P), and an error term (ɸ). Note however that a clean distinction between school properties and country policies is difficult or even impossible. Both public and private schools are dependent on laws and guidelines and thus even basic school properties such as location or size might be subject to changes for political reasons. For the estimations of the paper at hand the general model is converted to the full model that reads as follows:
Here, time invariant country properties such as robust policies or economic circumstances are captured by country fixed effects (D c ). Time fixed effects are controlled for by D t . The PISA data provide rich background information on students and schools. The full model includes student variables on gender, age, family and migration background, parental education, and number of books at home. On the school level, various measures e.g. on general school properties, autonomy, equipment and staff, assessment, or admission are included as controls. In addition, GDP per capita is included at the country level (Heston, Summers & Aten, 2011).
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The key variables for this paper are measured at school level and are as such properties of a particular school. Identification in the full model is then based on the independence of the error term from the respective key variable, which cannot be taken for granted. On the contrary, it seems likely that student selection into schools is correlated with one or several of the key variables. In Germany for instance centralized exams for 15ͲyearͲolds have been implemented in half of the federal states between 2000 and 2009. However, not every student has to sit these exams. Particularly, in some states students who plan to proceed to the final secondaryͲschool examinations (Abitur) -the prerequisite for tertiary education -do not sit the central exams at the age of 15. 11 Another potential selection bias could arise if schools are not obliged to publish results from standardized tests but can do so voluntarily. In such a scenario it is possible that only results from good schools are published and can be compared by parents. If parents then decide to send their children to the schools that provide this information, these schools may get the chance to choose more talented students. These exemplary selection effects are likely to bias the estimation. 
Estimation results
The results of the estimations are reported in Table 1. 14 As a first observation it can be noted that the two models yield qualitatively similar results. Despite the few degrees of freedom the full model all estimations tentatively confirm the results of the full model key regressions. The discussion is thus mainly based on the latter. Significance levels: *** 1 %, ** 5 %, * 10 %.
Ͳ 11 Ͳ
The results shown in Table 1 translate into the marginal effects of school incentives and teacher incentives illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 . 15 The graphs show that changes in school incentives tend to increase PISA scores if the incentives are linked to high levels of assessment standardization. On the other hand, such changes reduce PISA scores if linked to low levels of assessment standardization. These effects are most pronounced and widely significant for reading and mathematical literacy while they are not significant for scientific literacy. As for teacher incentives, the results are contrary. While evaluating teachers via student assessments in general improves PISA scores (significantly so for mathematical and scientific literacy), connecting evaluations to standardized tests is counterproductive for all three literacies. Note that leaving the interaction terms out of the regressions entangles the results and yields widely insignificant effects for standardized exams, positive effects of school incentives and negative effects of teacher incentives (cf. Table A5 in the Appendix). Altogether, these results lead to a partial rejection of all stated hypotheses.
Quantitatively, the large coefficients for the variables, particularly for the interaction terms, underline their importance. It should be noted, however, that the variation within countries and between points of time that is used for identification in these regressions does not cover the whole possible range. The interaction terms for example do not change between 2000 and 2009 by more than 0.54 in absolute value in any country. The medians of changes in the interactions of standardized tests with teacher incentives and school incentives are 0.06 and 0.13, respectively. These changes imply an average decrease (increase) of PISA scores by 12.1 % (29.8 %) of a standard deviation as a result of combining standardized tests with teacher incentives (school incentives). 
Discussion
The results show that standardized tests per se do not consistently increase PISA outcomes. 17 It is then crucial to analyze what the test results are used for. The key to understanding the presented results is the question why a link between standardized tests and comparing (and thus incentivizing) schools is fruitful while a link with evaluating (and thus incentivizing) teachers is not.
The pertinent literature indicates consistently that teachers respond to incentives. However, this also includes possible side effects of teacher incentives. Jacob & Levitt (2003) for example find indication for cheating by teachers and administration despite standardized student testing. They show that the prevalence of cheating strongly responds to changes in incentives. In addition to such unintended behavioural consequences of incentives, the results at hand could also be explained if the content of the standardized tests were not closely related to the competence based measures of PISA. If teachers then focus too much on their students' performance in the incentivized test PISA performance may suffer. Against the background of research supporting the relevance of PISA and what it measures (Hanushek & Wößmann, 2008; Schleicher, 2007) and the present paper, this interpretation should lead to an adjustment of the standardized tests or a detachment of their results and teacher incentives.
A third and complementary explanation for the overall negative effect of teacher incentives is provided by the method used in this paper. Identification here is based on policy changes within countries rather than variation between countries (as it is used e.g. by Wößmann). Thus, history may play a role. For example, the self selection of people into the teaching body is likely to be driven not only by the profession itself but also by aspects such as job security. Dohmen & Falk (2010) find that teachers in Germany are more risk averse than the average German population. Such preferences 17 Note that this result does not necessarily contradict results from other research. First, other studies often use curriculum based external exit exams as accountability measure. They may thus include an additional positive effect through student incentives to perform well in these exams (cf. footnote 4). Furthermore, some of the regressions presented here also reveal a significantly positive effect. Ͳ 13 Ͳ are likely to influence the effect of incentives. In a laboratory experiment in Germany, Helbach & Keldenich (2012) find that prospective teachers respond differently (i.e. more weakly) than other students to incentive scheme variations. Even though this interpretation by itself is unlikely to lead to negative effects of incentives it is possible that it reduces the positive incentive effects that are shown in Table 1 and thus contributes to the negative overall effect of teacher incentives.
In contrast to teachers, schools as a whole may not be able to influence the style and content of teaching to the same extent. Instead it is likely that incentivized schools are able to improve general measures such as atmosphere, learning environment, and general discipline (e.g. truancy). Claes, Hooghe & Reeskens (2009) provide evidence that schools play a major role in reducing truancy rates. These general improvements are likely to improve schooling outcomes -independently of the respective curriculum. However, schools are only incentivized to exert the required effort if they are held accountable for their performance. The results show that standardized tests can serve as an accountability measure while other student assessments cannot (cf. Table 1 ). This seems reasonable as results from nonͲstandardized tests may not convince the public of the good or bad quality of a school. Furthermore, as schools may be able to affect the framing of such results, they have no incentive to sustain high schooling quality. Instead, they may even be encouraged to develop tools for disguising deficits.
Conclusion
In Finland, the average results of the central exit exams (ylioppilastutkinto) of every Finnish high school are published every year by various media. The Supreme Administrative Court (Korkein HallintoͲOikeus) of Finland underlined the importance of these publications by judging that the results need to be made available to the public in electronic form as well (Korkein HallintoͲOikeus, 2007) . 18 It is this kind of comparison that imposes pressure -and hence incentives -on the schools.
At the same time, teachers can be rewarded -and hence incentivized -by individual cash bonuses that are not necessarily based on their students' performance in centralized exams. Based on the previous discussion, this is a sound incentive mix that may be one reason why Finland has proven successful in every PISA study so far.
The analysis has shown that school comparisons are a main channel through which standardized tests take effect. It is thus promising that both institutions are strongly correlated. In contrast, the correlation of the use of teacher incentives and standardized tests seems counterproductive in the light of the analysis while teacher incentives in general remain a way to achieve better schooling outcomes. 18 The ranking of 2011 is available for example on the website of Helsingin Sanomat, the largest newspaper in Finland (Helsingin Sanomat, 2011 , 2012 . Significance levels: *** 1 %, ** 5 %, * 10 %.
